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INTRODUCTION

The recent increase in so-called "mass" investment treaty claims
involving Argentina, the Czech Republic, and Spain put multipartite
arbitration in the spotlight. Specifically, considerable attention has been
*
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dedicated to whether dozens, if not thousands, of claimants should be
permitted to bring their claim in one set of proceedings when a single hostState is involved.
While investment arbitration involving several claimants is common and
considered de facto acceptable,' the question of whether a very high
number of claimants can bring their claims together has not been asked or
debated until recently. Strikingly, the question of whether such disputes
should necessarily be litigated together has not yet been given the same
importance.
In this paper, the authors consider arbitral practice in respect of
multipartite arbitration, but also dedicate special focus to the factual and
legal circumstances that may arise to alter whether it is efficient and fair to
continue a multipartite arbitration. We will show that, in certain complex
circumstances, this is not always the case.
In doing so, the authors focus on the three common scenarios that give
rise to multipartite arbitration: a parent company and an investment vehicle
as joint claimants, investors in the same investment as joint claimants, and
investors in different investments as joint claimants.
The authors conclude by recommending that, in multipartite
proceedings, tribunals consider carefully whether to hold a separate phase
during which it will be debated and decided whether, and if so, how,
proceedings should be consolidated.
II. WHERE THE PARENT COMPANY AND THE INVESTMENT VEHICLE ARE
JOINT CLAIMANTS

A. Arbitral Practice
This situation commonly arises in circumstance where an investment
vehicle brings a claim, together with its parent company, and wishes to
invoke the nationality of the latter. This is directly envisaged at Article
25(2)(b) of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
("ICSID") Convention, which refers to the possibility that "because of
foreign control," the parties to an investment treaty agree to treat a legal
person as "a national of another Contracting State for the purposes of this
Convention.", 2 Numerous investment treaties contain such provisions, and
1. Christoph H. Schreuer ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY,
277-82 (2d ed. 2009); see also HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION:
Article 25,
DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION ON
THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF

OTHER STATES 406 (1968) (quoting the British expert, Mr. P.J. Allot, who considered
implicit that "there might will be more than two [parties to a dispute], as other
provisions of the draft seem to admit.").
2. ICSID Convention art. 25(2)(b), Apr. 10, 2006.
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these are frequently invoked in ICSID and other types of investment treaty
arbitration.
For instance, in MTD Equity v. Chile,3 MTD Equity was the 100% owner
of MTD Chile, a company organized under the laws of Chile.4 MTD Chile
could therefore avail itself of the nationality of its parent company because
such a purpose was directly envisaged
in Article 6(2) of the Chile5
Malaysia bilateral investment treaty.
As the above example illustrates, it is uncontroversial that, in the
presence of adequate treaty language, there are no bars to a parent company
and its investment vehicle bringing a claim jointly against the host-State.
B. PracticalConsiderations
At first glance, no issue could arise from the parent company and the
investment vehicle bringing the claim simultaneously. Indeed, one might
think it makes little difference whether the parent company, the investment
vehicle, or both entities bring the claim.
However, various circumstances may arise in which the investment
vehicle does not have the same legal rights as its parent company under
investment treaty law. This is particularly the case when considering the
right to fair and equitable
treatment ("FET"), which is commonly set out in
6
investment treaties.
A key determinant of the content of the standard is the legitimate
expectation of the investor at the time of investment. Broadly defining the
standard, the ICSID Tribunal in Thcnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v.
Mexico stated that the FET standard "requires the Contracting Parties to
provide to international investments treatment that does not affect the basic
expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make
the investment.",7 In modern investment treaty arbitrations, whether or not
the investor could, at the time of the investment, legitimately expect certain
actions of the host-State has thus become a crucial determination on which
the outcome of the arbitration often depends.
However, consider the following hypothetical facts: domestic nationals
set up Company A, which massively invests into the exploration of natural
resources. The exploration is successful, and Company A starts producing.
3.
2004).

MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, (May 25,

4. Id. 94
5. Id.
6.

See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Article 15; Energy

Charter Treaty, Article 10(1).
7. Thcnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/00/2, Award, 154 (May 29, 2003).
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At that moment, the original owners sell fifty-one percent of Company A
to a foreign investor. The foreign investor does not have Company A make
any additional investments. It just purchases the fifty-one percent holding.
An investment dispute arises and the foreign investor and Company A
are both claimants. The FET standard undoubtedly protects the legitimate
expectations that the investor had when it purchased the fifty-one percent
holding in Company A. The question is, though, whether Company A has
the same legitimate expectations and if so, whether they are protected by
the FET standard.
Company A made massive investments, but it was not an "investor"
within the meaning of the applicable investment treaty at that time because
Should Company A be able to rely on
it was domestically owned.
legitimate expectations that it had at that time?
In a similar vein, Company A became a deemed foreign investor only
when the "real" foreign investor bought fifty-one percent of its shares, but
Company A did not make any investment at that time. Its stock changed
hands, but nothing more happened. Should Company A be able to rely to
the legitimate expectations that it had at that moment, even though it did
not make any investments?
These are very important questions because they may result in the
disposition of forty-nine percent of the overall claim.
In the authors' view, this simple example illustrates that when assessing
the legitimate expectations of the claimants in circumstances where a
parent company and the investment vehicle are joint claimants, a Tribunal
should carefully distinguish between the expectations of the parent
company and those of its investment vehicle. As the two entities may have
different histories and interactions with the host-State, it may follow that
the parent company and the investment vehicle have distinct legitimate
expectations. From such differences would necessarily arise different legal
protections under the fair and equitable standard.
Il1. WHERE INVESTORS IN THE SAME INVESTMENT ARE JOINT CLAIMANTS
A. Arbitral Practice
It is also common for claims to be brought jointly against the same hostState but under different investment treaties. For example, in the case of
Goetz v. Burundi, six shareholders instituted proceedings jointly. 8 The
Tribunal upheld its jurisdiction.9 Likewise, in Khlckner v. Cameroon,
Kl6ckner and two of its subsidiaries jointly claimed against Cameroon in

8. Goetz v. Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3, Award,
9. Id. 86 -89.

18 (Feb. 10, 1999).
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respect of the same investment, and the Tribunal upheld its jurisdiction.'
It is reported that, in both cases, the host-State did not contest jurisdiction
on that ground."
However, in GuaracachiAmerica, Inc. v. Bolivia, Bolivia objected to
multipartite arbitration on the ground that its silence did not constitute
consent. The case involved claims by Guaracachi America, Inc. and its
subsidiary in respect of the same investment but under two different
bilateral investment treaties.' 2 The Tribunal laconically rejected Bolivia's
objection, agreeing with an earlier decision that "it is evident that multi
party arbitration is a generally accepted practice in ICSID arbitration, and
in the arbitral practice beyond that, and that the institution of multi-party
proceedings therefore does not require any consent on the part of the
respondent Government beyond the general requirements of consent to
'3
arbitration."'
Interestingly, in Alasdair v. Costa Rica, 137 investors brought a claim
against Costa Rica under at least ten investment treaties on the ground that
the host-State did not sufficiently protect their deposits in a private
scheme. 14 Unfortunately, the issue of multipartite arbitration was not
considered because the Tribunal declined jurisdiction on the ground
that
15
there was no investment in accordance with the law of Costa Rica.
A crucial distinction, however, must be made in such circumstances
between proceedings under the ICSID Rules (both the Arbitration Rules
and the Additional Facility Arbitration Rules) and other arbitration rules,
and in particular the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
In ICSID procedure, it is the practice of the Secretary-General to register
disputes as part of a single set of proceedings when several claimants file a
single request for arbitration.' 6 Perhaps as a result, the de facto practice is
10. Kliickner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. Cameroon, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2,
Award, 21 October 1983.
11. See Alemanni v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8, Decision on
Jurisdiction, 285 (Nov. 17 2014) (where the Tribunal noted that it appeared that the
Tribunals in these cases appeared to have received "the particular assent of both parties
ad casum" to consolidation).

12. Guaracachi Am., Inc. v. Bolivia, PCA Case No. 2011-17, Award,

3, 5 (Jan.

31 2014) (noting reliance on the United States-Bolivia Bilateral Investment Treaty and
the United Kingdom-Bolivia Bilateral Investment Treaty).
13. Id. 7 341-43 (quoting Ambiente Ufficio S.P.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/9, Decision on Jurisdiction, 141 (Feb. 8 2013)) (stating that the silence of a
particular provision does not limit the scope of consent already given).
14. Anderson v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/3, Award, T 2-3 (May
19, 2010).
15. Id. 59.
16. Christoph H. Schreuer ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A
COMMENTARY, Article 25, 277 (2d ed. 2009).

AMERICAN UNIVERSITYBUSINESS LA wREVIEW

Vol. 5:3

that the host-State accepts that it is bound by the registration. Indeed, as
shown by the ICSID cases summarized above, challenges to the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal on the ground that distinct shareholders in the 1same
7
investment cannot bring their claims are rare and, so far, unsuccessful.
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, in contrast, do not require an
administrator to register a request. 8 A Notice of Arbitration must be sent
to the opposing party. 19 Consequently, if that party wishes object to any
form of consolidation, it might respond to that effect. 2° Further, to make its
intention unequivocal, that party might appoint a different co-arbitrator in
respect of each set of claims brought by a claimant.21
This was the course of action followed by the Czech Republic in respect
of the claims filed against it in 2013.22 The claims followed changes in its
legislation that affected photovoltaic power producers.2 3 Specifically,
faced with claims brought under multiple investment treaties by multiple
claimants with investments in different operations, the Czech Republic
agreed to the consolidation of the claims that involved the same investment
operation and the same investment treaties. 24 For those claims that did not,
however, the Czech Republic objected to consolidation, and appointed a
different arbitrator in each set of claims.
One group of claimants objected to the Czech Republic's response and
asked the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration to

17. It is, however, accepted that such challenges can be brought, as ICSID
Institution Rule 7(e) indeed requires the Secretary-General, when sending the Notice of
Registration, to remind the parties that the registration of the request is without
prejudice to the powers and functions of the Conciliation Commission or Arbitral
Tribunal in regard to jurisdiction.
18.

See

generally

UNCITRAL

Arbitration

Rules,

UNCITRAL,

http://w,,wv.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb rules- 2013/UNCITRALArbitr
ation-Rules-2013-e.pdf (last revised 2013).
19. See id. art. 3(1).

20. See id. art. 4(1).
See generallyid. art. 9.
22. See e.g., Press Release, Rdnana Solar, IPVIC: Solar Arbitration Commencing
Today (May 9, 2013) (on file at photovoltaic power producers) (announcing that eight
international investors filed a notice against the Czech Republic).
23. See e.g., id (stating that the claims alleged severe financial damages caused by
the introduction of "retroactive and discriminatory measures, such as a solar levy of
twenty-six peicent on the revenues of solar installations").
21.

24. See Luke Eric Peterson, Following PCA Decision, Czech Republic Thwarts
Move by Solar Investors to Sue in Single Arbitral Proceeding; Meanwhile Spain Sees

1, 2014),
(Jan
Arb. R.
New Solar Claim at ICSID, Invest.
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/following-pca-decision-czech-republic-thwartsmove-by-solar-investors-to-sue-in-single-arbitral-proceeding-meanwhile-spainsees-new-solar-claim-at-icsid/
25.

See id.
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designate an appointing authority under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
to appoint an arbitrator in lieu of the arbitrators selected by the Czech
Republic. 26
In other words, these claimants sought to force the
consolidation of their claims.
The Secretary-General refused to designate an appointing authority,
noting that the purpose of such designation is to safeguard the constitution
of an arbitral tribunal when, for example, one party fails to appoint the
second arbitrator or when an agreement cannot be reached on the
appointment of a presiding arbitrator. 27 As, prima facie, the Czech
Republic had actively participated in a timely manner by appointing an
arbitrator, the Secretary-General concluded that no vacancy existed to
justify an intervention to facilitate the constitution of an arbitral tribunal. 28
As a consequence, the arbitrations proceeded together where the Czech
Republic had agreed to consolidate, and separately where the host-State
had not.
In sum, it is easier for an investor to consolidate proceedings where the
rules provide for registration by an administrative authority. In contrast, it
is easier for a host-State to oppose joint claims by investors where the rules
afford the respondent the opportunity to appoint an arbitrator prior to
registration of the case.
B. PracticalConsiderations
The potential complexities that arise from having several shareholders
bring together claims in the same investment are manifold.
The complexities described above concerning the fair and equitable
treatment standard, which is in part premised on legitimate expectations,
also arise. However, the differences in legal protections may be even more
intricate because the claimants will likely have different backgrounds,
different negotiation histories with the host-State, different investment
terms, a different investment timeline, and may bring their claims under
different instruments.
For example, it could very well be the case that one claimant is an
experienced corporation that negotiated specific protections with the hostState and agreed to specific written investment terms, while the other party
might be a high risk speculative fund that purchased the funds years later at
a price that was discounted because the investment climate in the hostState deteriorated significantly. It is apparent that these two claimants,
although they might bring their claims together, are in fact not entitled to

26.

See id.

27.

See id.

28.

See id.
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the same legal protection.
The protection available to each claimant may also be widely different
because, commonly, the claimants are protected by different legal
instruments. This is the case when, as in Klickner v. Cameroon and
Guaracachi America, Inc. v. Bolivia, the claimant invoked different
investment treaties (whether bilateral or multilateral, such as the Energy
Charter Treaty or the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"))
because they hold different nationalities. In those circumstances, the
claimants will have different legal rights as provided for in the applicable
instruments.
Consequences may be important where key protections are provided
under one agreement but not the other. For instance, not all investment
treaties include an umbrella clause or a most favoured nation clause. 29
The jurisdictional issues facing the claimants may also be very different.
The most clear-cut example is that some investment treaties only allow the
arbitration of disputes involving expropriation. 30 Non-expropriation claims
thus may be available only to some of the multiple claimants.
Another example is the denial of benefits under some treaties that allows
a Contracting Party to deny investment protection where the claimant is
owned or controlled by nationals of that Contracting Party and the claimant
has no substantial business activities in the area of the Contracting Party
where it is organized. 31 The denial of benefits is not possible under all
treaties, and thus, it is possible that it can be invoked only against some of
the multiple claimants.
The fundamental difficulty with these differences is that they tend to be
ignored in the multiple claimants' pleadings. The multiple claimants
generally choose to present one storyline and one set of legal claims, as if
all the facts and legal arguments apply to all claimants alike. It is then for
the defendant state to properly differentiate among the individual claimants
in its defense-and this imposes a great burden on the defendant state,
when one would expect the claimants to have to demonstrate jurisdiction
and clearly set out the claims on the merits asserted by each of the multiple
claimants.

29. See e.g., Agreement on Economic Co-operation Between the Government of
the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Kenya, Nov. 9,
1970, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1793.
30. For example, the China-Peru Bilateral Investment Treaty, signed on June 9,
1994 envisages arbitration only in respect of "a dispute involving the amount of
compensation for expropriation." See Agreement Between the Government of the
Republic of Peru and the Government of the People's Republic of China Concerning
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 5 (Sept. 6, 1994.)
31. Article 17-1 of the Energy Charter Treaty is a notable example.
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IV. WHERE Two OR MORE CLAIMANTS IN DIFFERENT INVESTMENTS ARE
JOINT CLAIMANTS IN PROCEEDINGS ARISING FROM THE SAME MEASURE

A.

ArbitralPractice

Until recently, two or more investors in separate investments acting as
joint claimants in proceedings arising from the same measure were
generally not considered to cause any difficulty.
In Funnekotter v.
Zimbabwe, for instance, 13 claimants with investments in different farmsbut all protected under Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments Between Zimbabwe and the Netherlandsbrought claims against Zimbabwe in a single set of proceedings.32 The
Tribunal had no difficulty upholding its jurisdiction and it appears that no
objection was raised by Zimbabwe on that ground.33
This issue received more attention in recent years in the context of
"mass" claims following the three claims brought against Argentina by
numerous holders of unpaid sovereign bonds, and a string of cases against
Spain and the Czech Republic arising from changes to legislation affecting
photovoltaic power producers in both countries. The Argentinean cases, in
particular, drew attention because they concern thousands of claimants with
no relation to each other beyond the fact that their similar investment was
similarly affected by Argentina. We summarized above the outcome of the
procedural dispute in the Czech dispute. As to the Argentinean cases, all
three Tribunals refused to decline jurisdiction.
The majority in Abaclat v. Argentina considered that, although the
ICSID Convention was silent on whether collective claims are admissible,
it had the power to fill the gap and admit such claims:
[I]n the light of the absence of a definition of investment in the
ICSID Convention, where the BIT covers investments which are
susceptible of involving a high number of investors, and where
such investments require a collective relief in order to provide
effective protection to such investment, it would be contrary to
the purpose of the BIT, and to the spirit of ICSID, to require in
addition to the consent to ICSID arbitration in general, 34 a
supplementary express consent to the form of such arbitration.
35
The Tribunal therefore admitted the claim of 60,000 Italian bondholders.
The host-State's

arbitrator, Professor Georges Abi-Saab, dissented,

32. Funnekotter v. Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6, Award,

3, 19 (Apr.

22, 2009)
33. Id. 95.
34. Abaclat v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction,
517-20 (Aug. 4, 2011).
35. Id. 519.
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considering that the silence of the ICSID Convention could not mean
consent.36
In Ambiente Ufficio v. Argentina, the Tribunal ruled that the action

brought by ninety claimants amounted to multiparty proceedings (in
contrast to a "class action" or a "mass claim") of a type generally accepted
in ICSID arbitral practice. 7 The Tribunal therefore considered that "it is
evident that multi-party arbitration is a generally accepted practice in

ICSID arbitration, and in the arbitral practice beyond that, and that the
institution of multi-party proceedings therefore does not require any
consent on the part of the respondent Government beyond the general
requirements of consent to arbitration., 38 The Tribunal also noted that the
nature of claims involving mass instruments such as bonds would typically
The Tribunal therefore upheld
lead to collective proceedings. 39
jurisdiction. The host-State's arbitrator, Judge Santiago Torres Bernrdez,
dissented on the ground that the silence of the ICSID Convention did not
mean consent. 4°
The Tribunal in Alemanni v. Argentina had to decide upon its
jurisdiction in a case brought by seventy-four bondholders. 41 The three
arbitrators considered that there are three sets of circumstances where
arbitration is possible with a multiplicity of parties: (i) when it is
specifically provided for (e.g., in an applicable treaty or set of arbitration
rules); (ii) when it receives the particular assent of both parties, which
could be express or inferred; and (iii) where the instrument setting up the
arbitration or establishing the respondent's consent to it can properly be
interpreted, on the particular facts of the case, as covering the particular
multiplicity of claimants within that consent.4 2 The arbitrators concluded
that an investment treaty could be interpreted to cover multiple claims
where they pertained to the same dispute because the bilateral investment
treaty referred to "investors" (plural, thereby envisaging multiple
claimants) in relation to a "dispute" (singular, thereby envisaging a single
dispute).43 However, the Tribunal held that the decision on whether there
was the required substantive unity in the dispute submitted to arbitration

154-75 (Professor Georges Abi-Saab dissenting).
37. Ambiente Ufficio S.P.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, Decision on
Jurisdiction, T 114 (Feb. 8, 2013).
38. Id. 141-46.
39. Id.7144.
40. Id.TT 76-82 (Bernirdez, J., dissenting)
41. Alemanni v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8, Decision on Jurisdiction,
1 (Nov. 17, 2014).
42. Id. 285.
36. See generally id

43. Id. 287.
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could only be determined during the merits phase, and therefore concluded
that the arbitration should proceed but that its decision on that point should
be deferred. 44
Overall, as the above decisions illustrate, host-States have been
generally unsuccessful when objecting to multipartite arbitration. To date,
only the Czech Republic, in conformity with the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, has been successful in opposing consolidation using the method set
out above.
B. PracticalConsiderations
In the situations contemplated here, the difficulties summarized in the
two preceding sections reappear.
Specifically, it is possible that the claimants will have made their
investment in a different manner, following a different timeline, and under
the protection of different legal instruments. As a result their jurisdictional,
substantive, and even procedural rights may be vastly different. Various
examples were contemplated in the preceding sections. Moreover, because
the claimants will have made distinct investments, the difficulties are
magnified, making it increasingly probable that the rights of each claimant
will be different. When claims by thousands of claimants are considered,
as has recently been the case, the difficulties are multiplied exponentially.
Faced with these issues, the approach of the Tribunal in Abaclat v.
Argentina stands apart. The Tribunal, after upholding jurisdiction, decided
to dedicate a first phase of the arbitration to establishing the core issues that
would affect the merit of the thousands of claims, and in particular the
conditions that a claimant would have to fulfill for its claim to be granted.45
The Tribunal envisaged that it might find three types of issues at the end of
this first phase: (i) issues that might be of a general nature and would apply
to all claimants uniformly could be decided at once with regards to all
claimants; (ii) issues that, while generally applicable to all claimants, might
present certain objective features that would require making certain
distinctions among groups of claimants, and could be decided through a
sampling procedure; and (iii) issues to claimant specific that they would
require a case-by-case analysis. 46 The Tribunal therefore expressly
envisaged a multiplication of distinct proceedings within the same
arbitration. Surprisingly, the Tribunal envisaged the use of a "sampling
procedure" to determine the outcome of some of these proceedings, in
other words that the decision in a test case involving certain claimants
44. Id. 286-295.
45. Abaclat v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction,
668 (Aug. 4, 2011).

46. Id. 669.
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47
might be extrapolated to other claimants.
The Tribunal in Ambiente Ufficio v. Argentina took a different approach,
premised on its conclusion that it was not dealing with a "mass claim" but
with simpler multiparty proceedings. The Tribunal decided that it would
proceed normally, and that the proceedings were not "unmanageable", even
48
The Tribunal stated: "the Tribunal
if they involved ninety claimants.
cannot see a fundamental problem in taking evidence regarding, and
assessing, the individual case of each and every of the [ninety] Claimants
remaining in the case. ' 49 Interestingly, the Tribunal deemed irrelevant the
question of whether it was most efficient to decide the claims in a single set
of proceedings, as it held that this question had no bearing on whether it
had the right to conduct multipartite proceedings.5 ° Obviously, the task of
considering the individual case of ninety claimants would have been
colossal. As the case was discontinued in May 2015, the Tribunal was not
granted the opportunity to set out how it intended to carry out this
enterprise. Similarly, the case in Alemanni v. Argentina was discontinued
in August 2015 before the Tribunal could issue procedural directions
concerning the ensuing proceedings.
It is also worth highlighting the two efficient procedural arrangements
agreed between the forty-six claimants and Mexico in Bayview Irrigation
Districtv. Mexico,51 and the 109 groups of claimants and the United States
52
in the case known as CanadianCattlemen for FairTrade v. United States.
In both cases, the parties agreed that, at least for preliminary objection
purposes, the individual claims would be heard in one proceeding. The
underlying assumption was that if the host-State's objection was upheld,
all claims would be disposed of.
In Bayview Irrigation District v. Mexico, Mexico's pleadings show that
notwithstanding Mexico's objection to the claimants having unilaterally
joined their claims in a single proceeding, Mexico consented to having the
tribunal's jurisdiction for all claims determined in a single proceeding.53

666-67, 669. The Tribunal also referred to these as "bell weather
47. Id.
proceedings", likely intending to reference the bellwether approach sometimes
followed by United States courts when there is no other feasible way for the courts to
handle an enormous case load. In such proceedings, the court's decision on a common
issue is extrapolated to the other claimants. Id. 666.
48. Ambiente Ufficio S.P.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, Decision
on Jurisdiction, 166 (Feb. 8, 2013).
49. Id. 168; see also id. 164-72.
50. Id. 172.
51. Bayview Irrigation Dist. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/1, Award
(June 19, 2007).
52. Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade v. United States of America, UNCITRAL
Cattle Cases, Award (Jan. 28, 2008).
75
53. Bayview, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/01, Memorial on Jurisdiction
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Mexico eventually prevailed on jurisdiction and all claims were dismissed,
saving considerable time and costs. 54 In Canadian Cattlemen for Fair
Trade v. United States, the Tribunal's first Procedural Order recorded the
fact that, although 109 Notices of Arbitration were filed, the parties had
agreed to consolidate the claims.55
CONCLUSION

The above review shows that Tribunals have, so far, shown a propensity
to continue multipartite proceedings. Indeed, no Tribunal is known to have
"deconsolidated" proceedings. Only where the procedural rules allow the
host-State to block multiparty arbitration (namely, the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules) has a host-State been able to stop multipartite arbitration
from going ahead.
Perhaps even more strikingly, only one Tribunal is known to have given
extensive consideration to how, in practice, conduct the proceedings in a
manner that is most efficient for the parties.56 In contrast, the Tribunal in
Ambiente Ufficio v. Argentina took the view that whether or not it was most
57
efficient to decide the claims in a single set of proceedings was irrelevant.
Overall, the authors consider that the arbitral debate should not only
focus on whether there can be multipartite proceedings, but also on
whether there should be multipartite proceedings, and, if so, how to best
conduct these proceedings so that the rights of all parties are respected.
In most circumstances, it would likely be most efficient to conduct
multipartite proceedings, without impacting due process, rather than have
separate Tribunals determine each issue. The Tribunals, however, must be
very attentive to the differences between claimants and their claims, and
they should strictly require that the differences be explained and respected
in both parties' pleadings, especially in the claimants' statement of claim or
memorial.
Furthermore, as shown above, there may be circumstances where the
facts, the applicable legal framework, and the legitimate expectations of the
parties are so complex or vary to such an extent that it becomes
inefficient-and potentially undesirable-to continue consolidated
proceedings.

(Apr. 19, 2006).
54. Id. 77.
55. Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade v. United States, UNCITRAL Cattle Cases,
Procedural Order No. 1, 4 (Oct. 20, 2006).
56. See generally Abaclat v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction (Aug. 4, 2011).
57. Ambiente Ufficio S.P.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, Decision
on Jurisdiction, 172 (Feb. 8, 2013).
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For instance, assuming that the situation of each of the ninety claimants
in Ambiente Ufficio v. Argentina had been vastly different, it could possibly
have been extremely inefficient to have ninety subsets of proceedings
decided together by the same Tribunal.
Three highly sought after
arbitrators might find such endeavor extremely time consuming, leading to
inevitable delays.
Or, to take the example of an ongoing case, assuming that the Tribunal in
Abaclat v. Argentina eventually reaches decisions through a "sampling
procedure," the Tribunal will face the challenge of ensuring that the
decision that is extrapolated to other parties indeed applies squarely to each
party that is bound by it. Any other outcome would, obviously, be contrary
to due process.
The authors therefore recommend that, when faced with multiple
claimants, the parties and tribunals take the time to consider whether it is
actually more efficient and consistent with due process to proceed on a
consolidated basis.
First, if all parties agree, multipartite arbitration should naturally go
ahead. Indeed, it may very well be more efficient to do so. Consolidation
need not be agreed for the entirety of the proceedings. For instance, as in
Bayview v. Mexico, the parties might agree to determine jurisdictional
claim together, so that they might either all be dismissed together, or that a
decision might later be taken as to whether the claims should be split in the
following proceedings.
Second, if there is no agreement, the authors suggest that the tribunal
should carefully consider whether to hold a separate phase during which it
will be debated and decided whether, and if so, how, proceedings should be
consolidated. While it will rarely be necessary to hold such phase, there
may be circumstances where the issues are so complex that it is necessary
to do so to ensure that an appropriate decision is reached.
This suggestion resembles-but also differs from-the approach taken
by the Tribunal in Abaclat v. Argentina, which decided to hold a separate
phase between the jurisdiction and merits phases to determine the core
issues that would affect the merit of the thousands of claims, and in
particular the conditions that a claimant would have to fulfill for its claim
to be granted. In contrast to that decision, the authors recommend that this
phase take place prior to the jurisdictional phase. Indeed, the jurisdictional
phase is particularly likely to give rise to complex and differing claims as
multipartite proceedings often involve different jurisdictional requirements
and different sets of facts.
The authors believe that this exercise of additional caution and, when
necessary, of an additional procedural phase to decide how to carry the
arbitration, will, through debate and the emergence of best practices, result
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in more efficiency and a better arbitral process. It would benefit the Parties
because it would be an additional safeguard for efficiency and due process.
And it would, also, lighten the burden on the host-State and the Tribunal to
distinguish between the rights of each claimant.

